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muhammad abu Zahra’s muslim 
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Mohammed Gamal Abdelnour
‘His publishers call him Imam, ranking him with the great figures of Islamic 
scholarship of the past, such as Abu Haneefah, Malik, Al-Shafie and Ibn 
Taimiyah. Indeed, he has a great affinity with all these, as we will presently 
explain. If we consider this title on the basis of its linguistic meaning, which 
is a leader who shows the way, then he certainly was an Imam. And if we take 
it to mean a scholar of broad and varied knowledge, then he was certainly an 
Imam.’ 
Excerpt from an article in Arab News1
Muhammad abu Zahra was born on March 29, 1898, in the Nile Delta of Egypt. 
Following a traditional kuttāb education,2 ‘he completed his secondary educa-
tion at al-Ahmadi mosque in Tanta. In 1916, he entered the School of Shari’ah 
at al-Azhar in Cairo where he graduated in 1925. From 1932 to 1945, he held 
an appointment at the college of Usul al-Din, first as a teacher of rhetoric, then 
1 See: http://www.arabnews.com/node/216148.
2 Kuttāb: the term goes back at least to the 10th century. It is an Arabic word 
meaning ‘elementary schools’. Though it was primarily used for teaching children in 
reading, writing, grammar and Islamic studies such as qirā’āt (Qur aʾnic styles of recitation), 
other practical and theoretical subjects were also often taught. Until the 20th century, katātīb 
were the only means of mass education in much of the Islamic world. See: M Arsimov and C 
E Bosworth, The Age of Achievement, vol. 4 (Delhi: Banarsidass, 1999), pp. 4–33. 









as a teacher of the history of religions, denominations, and sects.’3 At al-Azhar 
today, abu Zahra is looked at as a polymath who has written over a dozen books 
on different areas, ranging from international relations in Islam to Islamic legal 
theories.4 Of particular relevance to the Muslim Theology of Religions, he wrote 
two significant books: 
Lectures in Comparative Religion, delivered in 1940 and published in 1965, 
and Lectures on Christianity, which were held and appeared in 1942. Abu Zahra’s 
audience for his two books on Christianity and on ancient religions is clearly 
made up of students from al-Azhar. Therefore, his two books reflect a pattern of 
subconscious mimetic appropriation.5 
In the areas of Islamic Theology as well as Islamic Law, abu Zahra’s views 
are of capital importance to the modern study of Islam. This importance owes a 
lot to him being a ‘critical insider’ in the full sense of the two words. Thanks to 
an insider criticality, his views travelled far and wide across the Muslim world. 
In 2001, a British non-profit educational foundation was established and named 
after him (Abu Zahra Foundation),6 aiming to revive this sense of criticality in the 
minds of Muslims living in the West. Abu Zahra died in 1974.
Abu Zahra’s name is closely linked to the critique of the traditional theory of 
abrogation (naskh).7 Although the theory of naskh has been central to the entire 
genre of Islamic studies, over the past century the theory has largely been cri-
tiqued. While abu Zahra’s position on naskh has been examined extensively, the 
impact of such a position on his Muslim Theology of Religions has not been 
investigated yet, i.e. the salvation question.8 This essay investigates two aspects 
of abu Zahra’s Theology of Religions: epistemology and soteriology. To clarify, 
3 J Waardenburg, Muslim Perceptions of Other Religions: A Historical Survey (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 244. 
4 J Brown, Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenges and Choices of Interpreting the 
Prophet’s Legacy (London: Oneworld Publications, 2014), p. 156. 
5 Waardenburg, Muslim Perceptions, p. 244. 
6 See: http://www.abuzahra.org/about-us/.
7 Naskh is ‘making a revealed text supersede another. The grounds on which abrogation can 
be made are many; one of which is the chronologically later provenance of the repealing 
text (reflecting a change of mind or position adopted in the earlier text); another reason 
for abrogation is when one text itself commands the abandonment of a matter specified 
in another text’. See: W Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p. 171.
8 It is worth mentioning that abu Zahra did not solely reject naskh in order to provide the 
scriptural and theological ground for the potential salvation of non-Muslims, but rather his 
critique of naskh serves other purposes as well. Indeed, this shows the centrality of naskh in 
the Islamic traditions. 
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the epistemological question is concerned with evaluating the phenomenon of 
religions in terms of their efficacy of leading a valid path to salvation, whilst the 
soteriological question asks whether religions other than one’s own have a chance 
of salvation in the Hereafter regardless of being salvifically effective or not. The 
chapter does not engage with naskh in the Sunnah (prophet Muhammad’s legacy); 
it only engages with it vis-a-vis the Qurʾan. It is, too, beyond the scope of this 
study to examine the theory of naskh in itself, but only to provide a context to abu 
Zahra’s Muslim Theology of Religions. 
The ‘epistemology’ question (Naskh Theory)
While naskh is accentuated by the majority of classical Muslim ulema and largely 
seen as a matter of ‘doctrine’, modern Islamicist scholars tend to question this 
outlook, seeing naskh primarily as an ‘exegetical device’ rather than a matter of 
‘doctrine’. A concrete example of this modern phenomenon is John Burton, who 
maintains that: 
The theory of naskh was an invention of Fiqh scholars and that a careful 
examination of the Qurʾan itself produces no evidence that naskh of the sort 
of Fiqh scholars had in mind is envisioned in or exemplified by the Qurʾan. 
The theory of naskh was developed as an exegetical device for dealing 
with apparent contradictions within the corpus of sacred texts; it allowed 
chronology to intervene as a means of eliminating real contradictions.9 
Ahmad Hassan traces the theory back to the end of the first century of the Hijrah 
(the Prophet Muhammad’s migration from Mecca 622 CE to Medina). He states: 
‘the idea of abrogation in the Qurʾanic verses must have appeared towards the end 
of the first century of the Hijrah, because it existed in the early schools of law.’10 
However, it actually originates from the time of the companions of Muhammad.11 
Upon hearing the central Qurʾanic verse on naskh; verse number 106, Sura 2, 
which reads: 
9 B Weiss, ‘The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation by John Burton’, in 
The American Oriental Society 113.2 (1993), p. 304. 
10 A Hassan, The Theory of Naskh, vol. 4 (Islamabad: International Islamic University, 
1965), p. 184. 
11 F Esack, Qur’an Liberation & Pluralism: An Islamic Perspective of Interreligious 
Solidarity Against Oppression (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 58. 









and translates to: ‘Any revelation We cause to be superseded or forgotten, We 
replace with something better or similar. Do you (Prophet) not know that God 
has power over everything,’12 the companion Umar said: ‘Ubbay is the best one 
to recite the Qurʾan among us and Ali is our best judge, and we ignore what 
Ubbay says in that he does not leave anything he hears from the Messenger 
of God though God High Exalted has said: (for whatever order We repeal or 
allow to be forgotten… etc).’13 What can be inferred from Umar’s statement is 
that naskh has been discussed among the companions of the Prophet, and since 
Ubbay was against it, it can also be inferred that the theory was not unanimously 
accepted. 
One question that needs to be asked, however, is whether this hadīth can 
stand as a proof for the rejectionists of naskh? It is highly unlikely that it can 
be used as such, since Ubbay was not against the theory per se, but apparently 
was against relinquishing something he knows for certain, i.e. having heard it 
himself directly from the Prophet, to something that has been transmitted to him 
through a third person, which may be less authentic. Therefore, for Ubbay, it is 
not a question of questioning naskh itself, but one of authentication. Yet Ubbay’s 
position is still of relevance to abu Zahra in the sense that Ubbay must have 
interpreted this Qurʾanic verse differently. That is to say, Ubbay does not seem 
to think that naskh can be deduced from such a verse and does not also seem to 
think it a matter of doctrine. 
By way of investigating the central Qurʾanic verse that seems to be highly 
endorsing naskh, a tripartite typology is offered.14 This typology comprises the 
following elements: sibāq (prior-text), lihāq (post-text), and siyāq (context). Sibāq 
is what comes immediately before the examined text in terms of the Qurʾanic 
ordering of verses; lihāq is what comes after it; and siyāq is basically the context 
wherein the prior-text, text and post-text meet. Indeed, any interpretation of a 
12 M A S Abdel Haleem, The Qur’an: A new Translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), p. 13. 
13 Al-Bukhari, Mokhtasar Sahih al-Bukhari, transl. Dina Zidan and Ahmad Zidan (Cairo: 
Islamic INC. Publishing & Distribution, 1999), p. 928. 
14 Although this tripartite typology is not literally developed by the classical Muslim 
scholars, implications of it can be found in the early tafsīr writings such as Tafsir al-Tabari 
(d. 310/923). See: Abdel-Hakeem al-Qasim, Dilalat al-siyaq al-Qur’ani wa atharutha fi 
al-tafsir, vol. 1 (Riyadh: Dar al-Tadmuriyyah, 2012). 
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Qurʾanic text/verse that does not consider the prior-text as well as the post-text is 
believed not to adequately grasp the text.15 In the pages that follow, this tripartite 
typology is applied to the Qurʾanic verse at hand. 
Discussing the verse quoted above, abu Zahra argues that most of the Qurʾanic 
exegetes interpret the verse out of context. This mis-contextualisation occurs in 
taking the word  in this verse to mean a literal Qurʾanic verse (a piece of 
Qurʾanic revelation), while, according to the Arabic lexical dictionaries,16 the 
word  is a homonym that has various connotations.17 With that being said, 
interpreting the word  here as a Qurʾanic verse is not necessarily the only 
feasible option. Furthermore, such an interpretation is not espoused by neither the 
prior-text, nor the post-text, and therefore is not conductive toward delivering the 
message of the text adequately. 
Two types of prior-texts can be introduced here.18 First, ‘textual prior-text’; 
second: ‘historical prior-text’. The ‘textual prior-text’, in this context, is the 
verse that immediately precedes the examined Qurʾanic verse, as opposed to the 
‘historical prior-text’, which refers to an incidence/occasion that has happened 
in correspondence with the revelation. Regarding the ‘textual prior-text’, the 
Qurʾanic verse that precedes ours, reads: 
which translates as: ‘neither those People of the Book who disbelieve nor the 
idolaters would like anything good to be sent down to you from your Lord, but 
God chooses for His grace whoever He will: His bounty has no limits.’19 This 
verse has nothing to do with the theory of abrogation in the traditional sense of 
15 M Abu Zahra, Usul al-Fiqh (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, 1958), p. 184–197.
16 See: J M Cowan, Arabic-English Dictionary (New York: Spoken Languages Services, 
1976), p. 36. 
17 Although the primary meaning of the word āyah is divine sign/sign of God, the word 
holds nine other possible meanings: 1) proof/evidence; 2) miracle/portent; 3) exemplar/
symbol; 4) revelation/message; 5) teachings/instructions; 6) Qur aʾnic verses; 7) lesson; 8) 
glory/wonder; 9) spell. See: M Badawi and M A S Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English Dictionary 
of Qur’anic Usage (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2008), pp. 68–96.
18 See: M A S Abdel Haleem, ‘The Role of Context in Interpreting and Translating the 
Qur’an’, in Journal of Qur’anic Studies 20 (2018), pp. 47–66. 
19 Abdel Haleem, The Qur’an, p. 13.









the term. Therefore, interpreting the next verse in terms of abrogating certain 
Qurʾanic verses is tantamount to taking the verse out of its context.20 
What about the historical prior-text? The verse above corresponds with an 
occasion that happened in the time of Prophet Muhammad; an occasion that verse 
153, Sura 4, talks about, which reads: 
translated as: ‘The People of the Book demand that you (Prophet) make a book 
physically come down to them from heaven, but they demanded even more than 
that of Moses when they said, (Show us God face to face).’21 Linking the two 
verses together, the Qurʾan tells the Prophet in Sura 2 that the unbelievers of 
Mecca were demanding a physical miracle, rather than an incorporeal one, i.e. 
the Qurʾan. That is to say that the verses of Sura 2 were highly likely revealed as 
a response to the Meccan’s demand; a response that lays down the foundations of 
Allah’s law of miracles, stating that: ‘any physical miracle We cause to be super-
seded or forgotten, We replace with a better or similar [i.e. non-physical] miracle’ 
(the Qurʾan).22 Based on the above, interpreting the word  here as a Qurʾanic 
verse is highly remote, for the word āyah is not necessarily a Qurʾanic verse but 
highly likely a physical miracle, if we consider the context. In fact, this is the 
capacity in which the Qurʾan, more often than not, uses the term āyah.23 As a cor-
ollary to this, neither the ‘textual prior-text’ or the ‘historical prior-text’ endorse 
the naskh interpretation, unless taken out of the ‘prior-text’ context, whether his-
torical or textual.
The post-text, in this case, is verse number 108, which reads: 
translated as: ‘Do you wish to demand of your messenger something similar 
to what was demanded of Moses?’24 The question that then arises is: what was 
demanded of Moses other than physical miracles? The Qurʾan talks about the 
20 Abu Zahra, Usul, pp. 184–197.
21 Abdel Haleem, The Qur’an, p. 64.
22 Abdel Haleem, The Qur’an, p. 13.
23 See for instance: verse number 50, Sura 2, discussing the physical miracles of Jesus 
Christ. 
24 Abdel Haleem, The Qur’an, p. 13.








 MUHAMMAD ABU ZAHRA’S MUSLIM THEOLOGY OF RELIGIONS 107
Jews asking Moses all the time for physical miracles.25 Historically speaking, 
this has also been demanded of Muhammad by the unbelievers of Quraysh. Why 
should an exegete then ignore the textual and historical prior-text and the textual 
and historical post-text for a literal reading? Indeed, ignoring the prior-text and 
the post-text, argues abu Zahra, seems to have diverted the majority of Qurʾanic 
exegetes from a logical interpretation based on the context of the verse.26 
Abu Zahra constantly reminds his readers that a Qurʾan exegete is not to resort 
to the theory of naskh as long as there is another way with which the appar-
ently contradictory Qurʾanic verses can be reconciled. And since all verses as 
such can be reconciled without resorting to naskh, abu Zahra rejects the practice 
entirely, stating that the reliance on naskh has caused many controversies between 
Qurʾanic exegetes. In this respect, Kamali writes: 
The conventional theory of naskh has not been free of distortion and 
forced logic, yet the scholastic works of the madhāhib took for granted the 
conceptual validity and occurrence of abrogation in the Qur’an and Sunnah. 
The inherent tension that is visited here has perhaps been manifested in the 
ulema’s disagreement over the actual incidents of naskh in the Qur’an, and 
the distinction that is drawn between naskh, and specification of the general 
(takhsīs al-‘āmm). Some of the instances of naskh were accordingly seen to 
be amounting to no more than takhsīs. The scope of disagreement over the 
occurrence of naskh was initially very wide and claims of several hundred 
instances of naskh in the Qur’an were gradually scrutinized and reduced by 
Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūtī, for example to about 30 cases, and then to only five by 
Shāh Walī Allāh Dihlawī. One of the early fourth century commentators of 
the Qur’an, Abū Muslim al-Isfāhnī, even claimed that abrogation had no place 
in the Qur’an whatsoever, stating that all the alleged cases of naskh were in 
effect instances of takhsīs… the basic tension between the classical theory of 
naskh and the timeless validity of the Qur’an prompted Imām al-Shāfi’ī into 
advancing the view that naskh was a form of explanation (bayān), rather than 
annulment, of one ruling by another.27
25 The al-Baqarah Sura reflects this. 
26 M Abu Zahra, Usul, pp. 184–197.
27 M H Kamuli, ‘Methodological Issues in Islamic Jurisprudence’, in Arab Law Quarterly 
11.1 (1996), pp. 13–14. 









How Does abu Zahra’s Take on Naskh Influence His Muslim Theology of 
Religions? 
abu Zahra’s lack of subscription to the theory of naskh meant, inter alia, that he had 
to offer different readings of certain other Qurʾanic verses, amongst which are those 
verses that talk about the fate of non-Islamic religions. In his, Zahrat al-Tafasir (lit-
erally translates as: The Flowers of Exegeses), abu Zahra deals elaborately with the 
central Qurʾanic verse that discusses non-Islamic religions. This is verse number 
62 in Sura 2, arguably the most pluralistic of Qurʾanic verses. The verse reads: 
and translates as: ‘The (Muslim) believers, the Jews, the Christians, and the 
Sabians – all those who believe in God and the Last Day and doing good – will 
have their rewards with their Lord. No fear for them, nor will they grieve.’28 
Looking into the Qurʾan commentaries shows that the vast majority of Qurʾan 
exegetes explicate this verse in one of two ways: 1) subscribing to abrogation 
by stating that this verse is abrogated by verse number 85, Sura 3, which reads: 
‘Whoever seeks a way other than Islam, it will never be accepted from them, and 
in the Hereafter, they will be among the losers;’29 or 2) specifying the generality 
of the verse, saying, for instance, that the acknowledged Christians, Jews, etc. 
here are only those who adhered to these religions before the advent of Prophet 
Muhammed, but when Muhammad came, they followed his message.30 
Under the title, ‘People are all Alike in the Sight of God if they Believe’, 
abu Zahra explicates the verse at hand, looking at it as a statement from God to 
all humans, stating that ‘belief’ is accepted from all faith-groups and religious 
denominations as long as they believe in God, the Day of Judgement and perform 
good deeds.31 This is the prime vehicle to salvation, abu Zahra says. Immersing 
himself in the discussion on a deeper level, abu Zahra examines these religions 
one by one. Starting with Islam, abu Zahra states that whoever follows Prophet 
Muhammad and aides his belief with the performance of good deeds that please 
28 abdel Haleem, The Qur’an, p. 9. 
29 Khattab, The Clear Qur’an: A Thematic English Translation (Canada: Siraj Publications, 
2016), p. 95. 
30 See full discussion on the exegeses of this verse in: J D McAuliffe, Qur’anic Christians: 
An Analysis of Classical and Modern Exegesis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), pp. 93–128.
31 M Abu Zahra, Zahrat al-Tafasir (Cairo, Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, 1987), p. 254. 
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God and benefits His creatures, is to appear under the category of those who need 
have no fear, and who will be spared from grief in this life and in the Hereafter.32 
The same principal applies to non-Islamic religions. If Christians, Jews, 
Sabians, or any other faith group, believe in ‘God, and that He begot no one nor 
was He begotten’, and who believe in all his messengers and in the Hereafter, 
there will be no fear for them nor will they grieve.33 However, abu Zahra offers a 
more detailed analysis when it comes to the Christians, arguing that there are two 
major disagreements between Christianity and Islam. The first one is to do with 
God and the second is to do with Prophet Muhammad. On the disagreement about 
God, abu Zahra explains:34 
Some Christians say that the Qurʾan itself assures them that there will be 
no fear for them nor will they grieve; a statement that gives recognition to 
Christianity as a valid path to salvation on its own merits. We say: the Qurʾan 
gives them that recognition on the condition that they believe in the oneness 
of God, He begot no one nor was He begotten, and that no one is comparable 
to Him. Do the Christians of today believe in these principals?! They rather 
say that God is a third of three, while God in the Qurʾan says: Those who say 
‘God is one in a trinity’ have certainly fallen into disbelief. They maintain, 
from the time of the Nicaean Council until this day, that Jesus Christ is divine, 
while the Qurʾan says: Those who say ‘God is the Messiah, son of Mary’ have 
certainly fallen into disbelief.35
As for the second disagreement, in his discussion of verse number 20, Sura 3, 
abu Zahra denies the salvation of anyone who denies the prophethood of Prophet 
Muhammad. By way of reconciling the two discussions, abu Zahra seems to be 
arguing for the salvation of whoever acknowledges Muhammad as a Prophet even 
if they remain true to their religious tradition without converting to Islam. Hence 
abu Zahra, on the one hand, accepts that there is salvation outside of Islam (differ-
ing from the Exclusivists who see Islam as the only valid path to salvation), but on 
the other hand holds that one has to be a monotheist and acknowledge the message 
of Muhammad in order to gain salvation. Whether or not Christians are trinitar-
ians in the way most Muslims understand trinity is a question to be studied in its 
32 Abu Zahra, Zahrat, p. 254.
33 Abu Zahra, Zahrat, p. 254.
34 Unless otherwise stated, the translation is mine. 
35 Abu Zahra, Zahrat, p. 256. 









own merits, but of relevance here is that abu Zahra features as a ‘Theo-centric 
theologian’, which is a transformative shift in the Muslim Theology of Religions, 
for all Qurʾan exegetes require not just believing in God as well as acknowledging 
Prophet Muhammad’s prophethood, but conversion to Islam. Although abu Zahra 
is not the first to have such a position on non-Islamic religions,36 his position is 
remarkable in that he solidifies it on the basis of his position on abrogation, which 
gives some epistemic recognition to non-Islamic religions, making the message of 
Islam more of a confirmatory nature to the previous monotheistic messages rather 
than one of abrogatory nature. 
Furthermore, the verse which is used by the majority of commentators to 
abrogate the verse central to this essay, is used by abu Zahra in quite a different 
manner, that is, for confirming his Theo-centrism.37 This is verse number 85, Sura 
3, which reads: 
and which translates as: ‘Whoever seeks a way other than Islam, it will never be 
accepted from them, and in the Hereafter, they will be among the losers.’38 While 
most of the Qurʾan exegetes take the word ‘Islam’ here to be technical Islam, abu 
Zahra considers it a linguistic term. That is to say that the word Islam in this verse 
does not mean the Religion Islam, but islam as a word that implies surrendering 
to God and submitting to Him alone. To abu Zahra, the term islam can be replaced 
with ‘purity/sincerity’.39 
To conclude, abu Zahra gives epistemic recognition and salvation efficacy to 
any religion that is of monotheistic nature, believes in all prophets of God and 
encourages good deeds. These are the three prime requisites for an individual to 
lead a valid path to salvation. In the pages that follow, the fate of those who do not 
tread the path to salvation will be examined. 
36 The Reformist School of Muhammad Abduh has a quite similar view. 
37 ‘Theo-centrism’ is not to be confused with ‘pluralism’. Although there is some 
significant overlap, theo-centrism revolves around God while pluralism revolves, 
in very generic terms, around the concept of the ‘Real’. See: http://www.ips.org.pk/
theocentrism-and-pluralism-are-they-poles-apart/.
38 Khattab, A Thematic English Translation, p. 95. 
39 Abu Zahra, Zahrat, p. 1302. 
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The ‘soteriology’ question
Do non-Islamic religions have a chance of salvation in the Hereafter?
Whereas the previous discussion was primarily epistemological, what is to come 
is substantially soteriological. The soteriological question here is: what is the fate 
of those non-Muslims who fail to meet the three requirements of salvation? More 
generally, what about those individuals who greatly contribute to the enhancement 
of people’s lives? Would they simply be thrown into perdition as a result of their 
failure to embrace Islam? While modern Muslim scholars disagree on this ques-
tion, the traditional position holds that such scholars, scientists and God-conscious 
people are entitled to a secular reward, e.g. being wealthy, healthy, praised in 
public, etc., but they are not entitled to a reward in the Hereafter. This is simply 
because in Islam a good deed will rewarded under two conditions of correct 
conduct and sincerity: 1) the deed must be conducted in compatibility with God’s 
laws which have been revealed to Prophet Muhammad; 2) the intention has to 
be worshiping God and getting closer to Him through the performance of a good 
deed.40 Based on these two conditions, such a category of people are entitled only 
to a secular reward in the Here, but not in the After. This is the traditional view. 
The proceedings of a roundtable discussion, published in al-Azhar mosque 
magazine in 1955, shows that although many modern Muslim scholars were in 
line with the traditional position, a few were an exception. Abu Zahra participated 
in the roundtable and discussed this thorny question, concluding that anyone who 
meets the requirements of salvation in the Here will be saved in the After even if 
he does not convert to Islam. As for those who fail to meet any of these requisites, 
abu Zahra makes it ‘clear that the deeds of non-Muslims, performed for the sake 
of humanity, are religiously meritorious in themselves, at least in circumstances 
in which the non-Muslim is not culpable for not adhering to Islam’.41 
Accordingly, abu Zahra affirms that God’s consciousness is the kernel and 
cornerstone of salvation. From verse number 115, Sura 3, which reads: 
and translates as: ‘And they will not be denied (the reward) for whatever good 
deeds they do: God knows exactly who is conscious of Him,’42 abu Zahra borrows 
40 M H Khalil, Between Heaven and Hell: Islam, Salvation, and the Fate of Others (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 46. 
41 Khalil, Heaven and Hell, p. 46. 
42 Abdel Haleem, The Qur’an, p. 43. 









the foundation of his theocentric position and makes a more obvious stance.43 
It should be noted that this is abu Zahra’s position on a verse that is interpreted 
by the majority of Muslim scholars to be entitling good non-Muslims to secular 
rewards only. 
Conclusion
In this investigation, two aims were sought after. First, to introduce abu Zahra’s 
position on the theory of naskh to the English reader, providing a hermeneutical 
tool that, more adequately, situates his position in the field of textual hermeneu-
tics; a tool that I identify as ‘the tripartite typology’, and which comprises the three 
notions of sibāq (prior-text), lihāq (post-text), and siyāq (context). The second and 
prime aim of this essay was to show how abu Zahra’s position on naskh influences 
his Muslim Theology of Religions epistemologically and soteriologically. 
The most obvious finding to emerge from this paper is that abu Zahra can be 
possibly classified as a theocentric theologian whose theology of religions starts 
from God and revolves around Him rather than being centred on the Prophet. Abu 
Zahra’s position is unique in the sense that although he is not an exclusivist in 
terms of salvation, he also is not a pluralist. That is to say that he is against loos-
ening the religious differences and blurring the boundaries between the different 
faiths. The emphasis he places on the question of the Trinity makes this crystal 
clear. 
One of the more significant findings to emerge from this chapter is that an 
exegete is not to explicate a Qurʾanic verse in a vacuum. That is to say that the 
hermeneutical tool applied in the course of reading abu Zahra shows how consid-
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